Disagreement

 Uit artikel in JoP over disagreement:

 What is relevant in the context of this paper are disagreeing verbal actions

such as Moratti's reply in example 1, i.e. utterances u2 that express a disagreement regarding a preceding utterance u1.

Disagreeing actions have a semantic, textual and sequential relation with u1. Semantically, u2 or some content implied by it is

incompatible with u1. On the textual level, u2 usually establishes cohesive links with u1, for example via simple negation (no),

a subset of corrective and contrastive discourse markers (rather u2, but u2),1,2 different kinds of anaphora referring back to u1 (I

don't think [so]u1, I don't agree with [what X said]u1), repetition of u1 (A: She lives in Munich e B: She doesn't live in Munich),

metadiscursive verbs (You're lying [by uttering u1]), downgraded or ironic epistemic evaluations of u1 (maybe, sure...), etc.

Sequentially, the refusal of sharing the commitment conveyed by u1 blocks or suspends certain courses of action projected by

u1. Given the general preference for agreement in conversations, disagreeing actions are often dispreferred responses and/or

open sequences of repair. However, in some contexts e e.g. when responding to compliments (Pomerantz, 1978) or in certain

phases of disputes (Kotthoff, 1993) e disagreeing is the unmarked response and should not therefore be considered a dis-

preferred option. All in all, the sequential implications of disagreeing actions seem to be dependent on various contextual

factors such as the specific subtype of action performed by the asserted u1 (informing, assessing, complimenting, explaining,

giving a subjective opinion, hypothesizing etc.), the activity type, or the distribution of roles among the participants.

Disagreement is of special importance in argumentation, which is often defined as an activity aimed at dealing with a

difference of opinion (e.g. Van Eemeren and Houtlosser, 2015:154e156) that concerns an issue (e.g. Sch€ar and Greco, 2018;

Rigotti and Greco, 2019:65e71), also called quaestio (‘question’, ‘problem’) or, in German, Streitfrage (‘question that is the

object of a dispute’) (e.g. Deppermann, 2003:14, Hannken-Illjes, 2018:116e120).

Caffi, 2007Heritage and Raymond,2005Rocci,2017Miecznikowski, 2020Kendrick, 2019Jakubícek et al., 2013Kraif and Tutin, 2017Kitzinger, 2013Giacalone Ramat and De Mauri, 2012Cuenca et al. (2019)Fedriani and Molinelli (2019)Rocci et al. (2020)

Epistemic marker

 Epistemic expressions are defined here as linguistic items and constructions that express either degree of certainty (e.g. certainty, doubt, probability, epistemic necessity, or epistemic possibility) or source of information (e.g. direct, indirect-inferential, or indirect-reportive evidence), or both.

Genoemd in: artikel in JoP over argumentatie

This paper investigates speakers’ use of the French epistemic expression je sais pas (JSP) ‘I

don't know’ and its variants (e.g., chais pas ‘dunno’) in dispreferred responses to questions

e i.e., responses that disagree or disalign with the terms set up by the prior speaker's

action. Drawing on multimodal conversation analysis, I identify two distinct uses of the

expression in the same sequential environment that systematically differ in terms of the

respondent's gaze conduct and features of prosodic and morpho-phonological delivery:

[JSP þ gaze averted from recipient], comprising a semantically bleached and formally

reduced JSP (chais pas), serves to project an incipient dispreferred response e JSP here

works as a particle-like disagreement preface; [JSP þ gaze on recipient], comprising a fully

epistemic use that tends to be produced in fuller form (je sais pas), serves to accomplish a

dispreferred response of the ‘claiming lack of knowledge’ type.