Vaak bij coaching; verschillende stappen : zie hier;
Stap 1: Observatie/ waarneming – Ik zie een concreet gedrag dat een invloed heeft op mijn welzijn
Stap 2: Gevoel(ens) – Ik reageer op dit gedrag met een gevoel
Stap 3: Behoefte(n) – Ik baken de behoeften, verlangens, waarden die dit gevoel hebben opgewekt af
Stap 4: Vragen/ verzoek – Ik vraag de ander om concrete handelingen die bijdragen aan mijn welzijn
Filmpje gemaakt voor the power of words, tekst bureau.
Maar ook toegeschreven aan Ogilvy (reclamegoeroe), maar dan ‘It is spring, but I am blind’
Nog weer later: het blijkt gegapt van Jacques Prévert na eerste wereldoorlog veteraan. En toen werd het: Het is lente, maar ik kan het niet zien.
1. and ipv but (nadruk op de klacht in plaats van op de twee feitelijkheden)
2. Emotie ipv feiten (ik ben blind, daar kunnen mensen niets mee, want feiten, zich voorstellen dat ze zelf niets kunnen zien, empathy, zegt een ander, werkt wel)
https://www.awai.com/2013/02/david-ogilvys-copywriting-technique/
https://asburyandasbury.typepad.com/blog/2011/04/im-blind-please-leave-my-sign-alone.html
« Le printemps va venir, je ne le verrai pas. »
In Handbook Linguistic Impoliteness
popular-science books, such as those by Melanie Citron
(2014), Jon Ronson (2015), and Jamie Bartlett (2014), that explore the
darker side of the internet, including aggression, mob-shaming, and even the
online black market.
Zie ook Handbook Palgrave over languages and conflict
Filmpjes als vaccins tegen desinformatie
Stukje in Psychology Today
Stuk Sjoerd de Jong, donderdag 25 aug.
Science Advances South Park Starwars
Whaccamole
Go viral heet het spel
Uit artikel in JoP over disagreement:
What is relevant in the context of this paper are disagreeing verbal actions
such as Moratti's reply in example 1, i.e. utterances u2 that express a disagreement regarding a preceding utterance u1.
Disagreeing actions have a semantic, textual and sequential relation with u1. Semantically, u2 or some content implied by it is
incompatible with u1. On the textual level, u2 usually establishes cohesive links with u1, for example via simple negation (no),
a subset of corrective and contrastive discourse markers (rather u2, but u2),1,2 different kinds of anaphora referring back to u1 (I
don't think [so]u1, I don't agree with [what X said]u1), repetition of u1 (A: She lives in Munich e B: She doesn't live in Munich),
metadiscursive verbs (You're lying [by uttering u1]), downgraded or ironic epistemic evaluations of u1 (maybe, sure...), etc.
Sequentially, the refusal of sharing the commitment conveyed by u1 blocks or suspends certain courses of action projected by
u1. Given the general preference for agreement in conversations, disagreeing actions are often dispreferred responses and/or
open sequences of repair. However, in some contexts e e.g. when responding to compliments (Pomerantz, 1978) or in certain
phases of disputes (Kotthoff, 1993) e disagreeing is the unmarked response and should not therefore be considered a dis-
preferred option. All in all, the sequential implications of disagreeing actions seem to be dependent on various contextual
factors such as the specific subtype of action performed by the asserted u1 (informing, assessing, complimenting, explaining,
giving a subjective opinion, hypothesizing etc.), the activity type, or the distribution of roles among the participants.
Disagreement is of special importance in argumentation, which is often defined as an activity aimed at dealing with a
difference of opinion (e.g. Van Eemeren and Houtlosser, 2015:154e156) that concerns an issue (e.g. Sch€ar and Greco, 2018;
Rigotti and Greco, 2019:65e71), also called quaestio (‘question’, ‘problem’) or, in German, Streitfrage (‘question that is the
object of a dispute’) (e.g. Deppermann, 2003:14, Hannken-Illjes, 2018:116e120).
Caffi, 2007Heritage and Raymond,2005Rocci,2017Miecznikowski, 2020Kendrick, 2019Jakubícek et al., 2013Kraif and Tutin, 2017Kitzinger, 2013Giacalone Ramat and De Mauri, 2012Cuenca et al. (2019)Fedriani and Molinelli (2019)Rocci et al. (2020)
Epistemic expressions are defined here as linguistic items and constructions that express either degree of certainty (e.g. certainty, doubt, probability, epistemic necessity, or epistemic possibility) or source of information (e.g. direct, indirect-inferential, or indirect-reportive evidence), or both.
Genoemd in: artikel in JoP over argumentatie
This paper investigates speakers’ use of the French epistemic expression je sais pas (JSP) ‘I
don't know’ and its variants (e.g., chais pas ‘dunno’) in dispreferred responses to questions
e i.e., responses that disagree or disalign with the terms set up by the prior speaker's
action. Drawing on multimodal conversation analysis, I identify two distinct uses of the
expression in the same sequential environment that systematically differ in terms of the
respondent's gaze conduct and features of prosodic and morpho-phonological delivery:
[JSP þ gaze averted from recipient], comprising a semantically bleached and formally
reduced JSP (chais pas), serves to project an incipient dispreferred response e JSP here
works as a particle-like disagreement preface; [JSP þ gaze on recipient], comprising a fully
epistemic use that tends to be produced in fuller form (je sais pas), serves to accomplish a
dispreferred response of the ‘claiming lack of knowledge’ type.
